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1Abstract
This paper introduces generalized potential functions of complete information
games and studies the robustness of sets of equilibria to incomplete information.
A set of equilibria of a complete information game is robust if every incomplete
information game where payoﬀs are almost always given by the complete information
game has an equilibrium which generates behavior close to some equilibrium in the
set. This paper provides suﬃcient conditions for the robustness of sets of equilibria
in terms of argmax sets of generalized potential functions. These suﬃcient conditions
unify and generalize existing suﬃcient conditions. Our generalization of potential
games is useful in other game theoretic problems where potential methods have been
applied.
Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation numbers: C72, D82.
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21 Introduction
Outcomes of a game with common knowledge of payoﬀs may be very diﬀerent from out-
comes of the game with a “small” departure from common knowledge, as demonstrated
by Rubinstein [27] and Carlsson and van Damme [4]. This observation lead Kajii and
Morris [12] to study which equilibria of complete information games are not much af-
fected by weakening the assumption of common knowledge; they studied the robustness
of equilibria to incomplete information. An equilibrium of a complete information game
is robust if every incomplete information game with payoﬀs almost always given by the
complete information game has an equilibrium which generates behavior close to that
equilibrium.
Kajii and Morris [13] demonstrated that robustness can be seen as a very strong
reﬁnement of Nash equilibria. The reﬁnements literature examines what happens to
a given Nash equilibrium in perturbed versions of the complete information game. A
weak class of reﬁnements requires only that the Nash equilibrium continues to be an
equilibrium in some nearby perturbed game. The notion of perfect equilibria due to
Selten [28] is the leading example of this class. A stronger class requires that the Nash
equilibrium continues to be played in all perturbed nearby games. The notion of stable
equilibria due to Kohlberg and Mertens [14] or that of strictly perfect equilibria due to
Okada [21] are leading examples of this class. Robustness belongs to the latter, stronger,
class of reﬁnements. Moreover, robustness to incomplete information allows an extremely
rich set of perturbed games. In particular, while Kohlberg and Mertens [14] allowed only
independent action trembles across players, the deﬁnition of robustness leads to highly
correlated trembles and thus an even stronger reﬁnement. Indeed, Kajii and Morris [12]
constructed an example in the spirit of Rubinstein [27] to show that even a game with a
unique Nash equilibrium, which is strict, may fail to have any robust equilibrium.
Kajii and Morris [12] and Ui [34] provided suﬃcient conditions for the robustness
of equilibria. Kajii and Morris [12] introduced the concept of p-dominance where p =
(p1,...,pn) is a vector of probabilities.1 An action proﬁle is a p-dominant equilibrium
if each player’s action is a best response whenever he assigns probability at least pi to
his opponents choosing actions according to the action proﬁle. Kajii and Morris [12]
showed that a p-dominant equilibrium with
P
i pi < 1 is robust. Ui [34] considered
1Morris et al. [19] earlier presented results about the case where each player had the same pi.
3robust equilibria of potential games, a class of complete information games possessing
potential functions. As deﬁned by Monderer and Shapley [18], a potential function is
a function on the action space that incorporates information about players’ preferences
over the action space that is suﬃcient to determine all the equilibria. Ui [34] showed
that the action proﬁle that uniquely maximizes a potential function is robust.
These two results are developed in quite diﬀerent frameworks, and on the face of it the
relationship between the two is not clear. The purpose of this paper is to provide a new
suﬃcient condition for robustness, which uniﬁes and generalizes the suﬃcient conditions
provided by Kajii and Morris [12] and Ui [34]. Furthermore, the condition can be used to
provide new suﬃcient conditions for robustness and applies not only to the robustness of
equilibria but also the robustness of sets of equilibria. This paper introduces generalized
potential functions and provides the condition in terms of argmax sets of generalized
potential functions.
We start by deﬁning the robustness concept as a set valued one,2 the robustness of
sets of equilibria to incomplete information. A set of equilibria of a complete information
game is robust if every incomplete information game with payoﬀs almost always given
by the complete information game has an equilibrium which generates behavior close to
some equilibrium in the set. If a robust set is a singleton then the equilibrium is robust
in the sense of Kajii and Morris [12, 13]. Because some games have no robust equilibria,
it is natural to ask if a set of equilibria is robust.
We then introduce generalized potential functions. A generalized potential function
is a function on a covering of the action space, a collection of subsets of the action space
such that the union of the subsets is the action space. It incorporates some information
about players’ preferences over the collection of subsets. We call each element of the
domain of a generalized potential function an action subspace. If an action subspace
maximizes a generalized potential function and the generalized potential function has
a unique maximum then we call the action subspace a generalized potential maximizer
(GP-maximizer).
The main results state that there exists a correlated equilibrium assigning probability
1 to a GP-maximizer and that the set of such correlated equilibria is robust. This
immediately implies that if a GP-maximizer consists of one action proﬁle then the action
2Kohlberg and Mertens [14] were the ﬁrst to propose making sets of equilibria the objects of a theory
of equilibrium reﬁnements.
4proﬁle is a robust equilibrium. It should be noted that a robust set induced by the GP-
maximizer condition is not always minimal. A robust set is minimal if no robust set is
a proper subset of the robust set. In this paper, we do not explore the problem of how
to identify minimal robust sets.
It is not so straightforward to ﬁnd GP-maximizers from the deﬁnition. One reason
is that, as we will see later, a complete information game may have multiple generalized
potential functions with diﬀerent domains. We restrict attention to generalized potential
functions with two special classes of domains. One class of domains are unordered parti-
tions of action spaces. We introduce best-response potential functions as functions over
the partitions such that the best response correspondence of the function deﬁned over
the partition coincides with that of a complete information game. Potential functions
of Monderer and Shapley [18] form a special class of best-response potential functions
with the ﬁnest partitions.3 We show that a best-response potential function is a gen-
eralized potential function. The other class of domains are those induced by ordered
partitions of action spaces. We introduce monotone potential functions as functions over
the partitions such that the best response correspondence of the function deﬁned over
the partition and that of a complete information game has some monotonic relationship
with respect to the order relation of the partition. We show that a monotone potential
function naturally induces a generalized potential function where the domain consists of
intervals of the ordered partition. We then show that a p-dominant equilibrium with
P
i pi < 1 is the induced GP-maximizer, by which the discussion of Kajii and Morris [12]
and that of Ui [34] are uniﬁed. We also provide new suﬃcient conditions for action pro-
ﬁle sets to be GP-maximizers, review some recent applications that use these suﬃcient
conditions and give some new examples showing how the generalized potential analysis
can be used when the methods of Kajii and Morris [12] and Ui [34] fail.
The uniﬁcation of the potential maximizer condition and the p-dominance condition
may be of interest in other contexts. For example, both conditions are widely used in
evolutionary contexts. For stochastic evolutionary dynamics, the potential maximizer
condition is discussed by Blume [2, 3] and Ui [32], and the p-dominance condition is
discussed by Ellison [7] and Maruta [16]. For perfect foresight dynamics ´ a la Matsui
and Matsuyama [17], the potential maximizer condition is discussed by Hofbauer and
3Morris and Ui [20] demonstrated that the class of best-response potential functions with the ﬁnest
partitions are much larger than the class of potential functions.
5Sorger [10, 11], and the p-dominance condition is discussed by Oyama [23]. Interest-
ingly, a recent paper by Oyama et al. [24] shows that singleton GP-maximizers induced
by monotone potential functions satisfy the stability conditions of perfect foresight dy-
namics. This implies that “generalized potential” methods may work in other contexts,
unifying the potential maximizer and p-dominance conditions. This is not surprising,
we believe, because GP-maximizers are deﬁned so that they inherit some properties of
potential maximizers. We show in this paper that GP-maximizers inherit the robustness
property of potential maximizers, while Oyama et al. [24] show that GP-maximizers
inherit the stability properties of potential maximizers.
Rosenthal [26] was the ﬁrst to use potential functions in noncooperative game the-
ory.4 He used potential functions as tools for ﬁnding pure-action Nash equilibria.5 Re-
cent studies such as Blume [2, 3], Ui [32, 34], and Hofbauer and Sorger [10, 11] used
potential functions as tools for ﬁnding Nash equilibria satisfying some criteria for equi-
librium selection. Since a narrow class of games admit potential functions, attempts
have been made to introduce tools for a broader class of games. Monderer and Shapley
[18] introduced ordinal potential functions6 and generalized ordinal potential functions.
Voorneveld [35] introduced best-response potential functions,7 which are diﬀerent from
best-response potential functions in this paper. These functions inherit ordinal aspects
of potential functions and serve as tools for the former use (ﬁnding pure-action equilib-
ria). They are in clear contrast to generalized potential functions in this paper, which
serve as tools for the latter use (reﬁning equilibria).
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 deﬁnes robust sets of equilibria.
Section 3 introduces generalized potential functions. Section 4 provides the main results.
Section 5 discusses best-response potential functions and Section 6 discusses monotone
potential functions. Section 7 reports examples of generalized potential functions. Sec-
tion 8 concludes the paper.
4Hart and Mas-Colell [9] have introduced potential functions in cooperative game theory. The potential
functions of Monderer and Shapley [18] can be regarded as an extension of the potential functions of
Hart and Mas-Colell [9] to noncooperative games, as demonstrated by Ui [33].
5In traﬃc network theory, non-atomic games similar to the ﬁnite games of Rosenthal [26] are studied
and non-atomic potential functions are used to calculate pure-action Nash equilibria. See Oppenheim
[22], for example.
6See also Kukushkin [15].
7Ui [32] considered similar functions in the context of stochastic evolutionary games.
62 Robust Sets
A complete information game consists of a ﬁnite set of players N, a ﬁnite action set Ai
for i ∈ N, and a payoﬀ function gi : A → R for i ∈ N where A =
Q
i∈N Ai. We write
A−i =
Q
j6=i Aj and a−i = (aj)j6=i ∈ A−i. We also write, for S ∈ 2N, AS =
Q
i∈S Ai
and aS = (ai)i∈S ∈ AS. Because we will ﬁx N and A throughout the paper, we simply
denote a complete information game by g = (gi)i∈N.









i ∈ Ai.8 An action distribution µ ∈ ∆(A) is a Nash equilibrium of g if it is a
correlated equilibrium and, for all a ∈ A, µ(a) =
Q
i∈N µi(ai) where µi ∈ ∆(Ai). We also
say that a ∈ A is a Nash equilibrium if µ ∈ ∆(A) with µ(a) = 1 is a Nash equilibrium.
Consider an incomplete information game with the set of players N and the action
space A. Let Ti be a countable set of types of player i ∈ N. The state space is
T =
Q
i∈N Ti. We write T−i =
Q
j6=i Tj and t−i = (tj)j6=i ∈ T−i. Let P ∈ ∆(T) be the
prior probability distribution on T with
P
t−i∈T−i P(ti,t−i) > 0 for all i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti.
A payoﬀ function of player i ∈ N is a bounded function ui : A × T → R. Because we
will ﬁx T, N, and A throughout the paper, we simply denote an incomplete information
game by (u,P) where u = (ui)i∈N.
A (mixed) strategy of player i ∈ N is a mapping σi : Ti → ∆(Ai). We write
Σi for the set of strategies of player i. The strategy space is Σ =
Q
i∈N Σi. We write
Σ−i =
Q
j6=i Σj and σ−i = (σj)j6=i ∈ Σ−i. We write σi(ai|ti) for the probability of ai ∈ Ai





j6=i σj(aj|tj) respectively. Let σP ∈ ∆(A) be such that σP(a) =
P
t∈T P(t)σ(a|t) for all a ∈ A. We call σP an action distribution generated by σ.












for all ti ∈ Ti and a0
i ∈ Ai where P(t−i|ti) = P(ti,t−i)/
P




a∈A P(t)σ(a|t)ui(a,t) be the payoﬀ of strategy proﬁle σ ∈ Σ to player i ∈ N.
8For any ﬁnite or countable set S, ∆(S) denotes the set of all probability distributions on S.
7Then, σ ∈ Σ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of (u,P) if and only if, for each i ∈ N,
Ui(σ) ≥ Ui(σ0
i,σ−i) for all σ0
i ∈ Σi.
For given g, consider the following subset of Ti:
T
ui
i = {ti ∈ Ti |ui(a,(ti,t−i)) = gi(a) for all a ∈ A, t−i ∈ T−i with P(ti,t−i) > 0}.
When ti ∈ T
ui
i is realized, payoﬀs of player i are given by gi and he knows his payoﬀs.





Deﬁnition 1 An incomplete information game (u,P) is an ε-elaboration of g if P(Tu) =
1 − ε for ε ∈ [0,1].
Payoﬀs of a 0-elaboration are given by g with probability 1 and every player knows
his payoﬀs. It is straightforward to see that if a 0-elaboration has a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium σ ∈ Σ then an action distribution generated by σ, σP ∈ ∆(A), is a correlated
equilibrium of g. Kajii and Morris [12, Corollary 3.5] showed the following property of
ε-elaborations, which we will use later.
Lemma 1 Let {(uk,Pk)}∞
k=1 be such that (uk,Pk) is an εk-elaboration of g and εk → 0
as k → ∞. Let σk be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of (uk,Pk) and let σk
Pk be an action
distribution generated by σk. Then {σk
Pk}∞
k=1 has a subsequence which converges to some
correlated equilibrium of g.
We say that a set of correlated equilibria of g is robust if, for small ε > 0, every
ε-elaboration of g has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ ∈ Σ such that σP ∈ ∆(A) is close
to some equilibrium in the set.
Deﬁnition 2 A set of correlated equilibria of g, E ⊆ ∆(A), is robust to all elaborations
in g if, for every δ > 0, there exists ¯ ε > 0 such that, for all ε ≤ ¯ ε, every ε-elaboration
(u,P) of g has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ ∈ Σ such that maxa∈A |µ(a)−σP(a)| ≤ δ
for some µ ∈ E.
If E is a singleton then the equilibrium in E is robust in the sense of Kajii and
Morris [12].
Kajii and Morris [13] considered a weaker version of the robustness of equilibria than
that of Kajii and Morris [12].9 We consider the corresponding version of the robustness
9The diﬀerence between them is an open question.
8of sets of equilibria. A type ti ∈ Ti\T
ui
i is committed if player i of this type has a strictly
dominant action a
ti
i ∈ Ai such that ui((a
ti
i ,a−i),(ti,t−i)) > ui((ai,a−i),(ti,t−i)) for all
ai ∈ Ai\{a
ti
i }, a−i ∈ A−i, and t−i ∈ T−i with P(ti,t−i) > 0. An ε-elaboration of g is
canonical if every ti ∈ Ti\T
ui
i is committed for all i ∈ N.
Deﬁnition 3 A set of correlated equilibria of g, E ⊆ ∆(A), is robust to canonical elab-
orations in g if, for every δ > 0, there exists ¯ ε > 0 such that, for all ε ≤ ¯ ε, every
canonical ε-elaboration (u,P) of g has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ ∈ Σ such that
maxa∈A |µ(a) − σP(a)| ≤ δ for some µ ∈ E.
If E is a singleton then the equilibrium in E is robust in the sense of Kajii and
Morris [13].
In Section 4, we will provide two suﬃcient conditions for the robustness of sets of
equilibria, one for the robustness to all elaborations and the other for the robustness to
canonical elaborations respectively.
For either of the robustness concepts, if E is robust then a set of correlated equilibria
E0 with E ⊆ E0 is also robust. A robust set E is minimal if no robust set is a proper
subset of E. In this paper, we do not explore the problem of how to identify minimal
robust sets.
Kajii and Morris [12] provided two suﬃcient conditions for the robustness of singleton
equilibria. One applies to games with unique correlated equilibria.
Theorem 1 If a∗ ∈ A is a unique correlated equilibrium of g, then {a∗} is robust to all
elaborations in g.
The other applies to games with p-dominant equilibria such that
P
i∈N pi < 1.
Deﬁnition 4 Let p = (pi)i∈N ∈ [0,1]N. Action proﬁle a∗ ∈ A is a p-dominant equilib-









for ai ∈ Ai.
Theorem 2 If a∗ ∈ A is a p-dominant equilibrium of g with
P
i∈N pi < 1, then {a∗}
is robust to all elaborations in g.
9Ui [34] provided a suﬃcient conditions for the robustness of singleton equilibria in
potential games introduced by Monderer and Shapley [18].
Deﬁnition 5 A function f : A → R is a weighted potential function of g if there exists








for all i ∈ N, ai,a0
i ∈ Ai, and a−i ∈ A−i. A complete information game g is a weighted
potential game if it has a weighted potential function. When wi = 1 for i ∈ N, we call f
a potential function and g a potential game.
Theorem 3 Let g be a potential game with a potential function f. Suppose that {a∗} =
argmaxa∈A f(a). Then {a∗} is robust to canonical elaborations in g.
Suﬃcient conditions provided by Kajii and Morris [12] and Ui [34] do not apply to
the game g given by the following table.
g
0 1 2
0 3, 2 2, 3 0, 0
1 2, 3 3, 2 0, 0
2 0, 0 0, 0 1, 1
This game has multiple equilibria and thus Theorem 1 does not apply. This game does
not have a potential function and thus Theorem 3 does not apply. This game has one
strict Nash equilibrium 2 = (2,2). For one player to choose 2, he must believe that his
opponent chooses 2 with probability at least 2/3. This implies that, if 2 is a p-dominant
equilibrium, then it must be true that p1 + p2 ≥ 4/3. Thus, Theorem 2 does not apply.
3 Generalized Potentials
















10for all i ∈ N, ai,a0










for all i ∈ N and λi ∈ ∆(A−i). We generalize (2) to deﬁne generalized potential func-
tions.10
Before providing a formal deﬁnition, we present an example. Consider g discussed
in the previous section as an example. Remember that Ai = {0,1,2} for i ∈ N = {1,2}.
We deﬁne a collection of subsets of Ai, Ai = {{0,1},{0,1,2}} for i ∈ N, and deﬁne





The function F has the following property: for Λi ∈ ∆(Aj) and λi ∈ ∆(Aj) with
λi(0) + λi(1) ≥ Λi({0,1}),











where i 6= j. As we will see later, F is a generalized potential function of g.
To provide the formal deﬁnition, we ﬁrst introduce the domain of a generalized
potential function denoted by A. For each i ∈ N, let Ai ⊆ 2Ai\∅ be a covering of Ai.
That is, Ai is a collection of nonempty subsets of Ai such that
S
Xi∈Ai Xi = Ai. The
domain of a generalized potential function is A = {
Q
i∈N Xi |Xi ∈ Ai for i ∈ N}. We
write A−i = {
Q
j6=i Xj |Xj ∈ Aj for j 6= i} and X−i =
Q
j6=i Xj ∈ A−i. Note that A and
A−i are coverings of A and A−i respectively. We call X ∈ A an action subspace.
We then introduce, for Λi ∈ ∆(A−i), a corresponding subset of ∆(A−i) denoted
by ∆Λi(A−i). Imagine that player i believes that a−i ∈ A−i is chosen in two steps:
ﬁrst, X−i ∈ A−i is chosen according to Λi ∈ ∆(A−i), and then, a−i ∈ X−i is chosen
according to some λ
X−i
i ∈ ∆(A−i) such that λ
X−i
i assigns probability 1 to X−i, i.e.,
10The existence of a function f such that property (2) is satisﬁed is in fact a necessary but not a













for all a−i ∈ A−i. We write ∆Λi(A−i) for the set of the beliefs of player i over A−i
induced by the above rule:





i (a−i) for a−i ∈ A−i,
λ
X−i





i (a−i) = 1 for X−i ∈ A−i}.
Deﬁnition 6 A function F : A → R is a generalized potential function of g if, for all
i ∈ N, Λi ∈ ∆(A−i), and λi ∈ ∆Λi(A−i),















such that Xi is maximal in the argmax set ordered by the set inclusion relation. An action
subspace X∗ ∈ A is a generalized potential maximizer (GP-maximizer) if F(X∗) > F(X)
for all X ∈ A\{X∗}.
It is clear that F : A → R in the above example is a generalized potential function
because ∆Λi(Aj) ⊆ {λi ∈ ∆(Aj)|λi(0) + λi(1) ≥ Λi({0,1})} where i 6= j.
At the extreme, consider F : A → R such that Ai = {Ai} for all i ∈ N. Note that
A = {A}. Clearly, every complete information game has a generalized potential function
of this type. At the other extreme, consider F : A → R such that Ai = {{ai}|ai ∈ Ai}
for all i ∈ N. Note that A = {{a}|a ∈ A}. A weighted potential game has a generalized
potential function of this type, which we prove in Section 5.
Lemma 2 If g is a weighted potential game with a weighted potential function f then
g has a generalized potential function F : A → R such that Ai = {{ai}|ai ∈ Ai} for all
i ∈ N and F({a}) = f(a) for all a ∈ A.
Before closing this section, we give a characterization of ∆Λi(A−i).








for all B−i ∈ 2A−i.
This lemma is an immediate consequence of the result of Strassen [30], which is well
known in the study of Dempster-Shafer theory.11 Dempster-Shafer theory considers non-
additive probability functions called belief functions. Every Λi ∈ ∆(A−i), called a basic
probability assignment, deﬁnes a corresponding belief function v
Λi









for all B−i ∈ 2A−i. It is known that the correspondence between Λi and v
Λi
i is one-to-







for all B−i ∈ 2A−i.12 Strassen [30] proved that, for all Λi ∈ ∆(A−i), λi is compatible
with v
Λi
i if and only if λi ∈ ∆Λi(A−i), which is exactly Lemma 3.
4 Main Results
Suppose that g has a generalized potential function F : A → R with a GP-maximizer
X∗. Let EX∗ be the set of correlated equilibria of g that assign probability 1 to X∗:




The set EX∗ contains at least one Nash equilibrium. To see this, observe that
X∗




11Dempster [5, 6] and Shafer [29].
12In literature of non-additive probabilities written by economists, λi is called a core of v
Λi
i because it
is a core when we regard B−i ∈ 2
A−i as a coalition.
13By the deﬁnition of generalized potential functions,
X∗





for every λi ∈ ∆(A−i) with
P
a−i∈X∗
−i λi(a−i) = 1. This implies that the best response
correspondence of g restricted to X∗ has nonempty values. Thus, we can show the
existence of Nash equilibria in EX∗ in the standard way using Kakutani ﬁxed point
theorem.
Our main results state that EX∗ is robust. We present two theorems below. In The-
orem 4, we consider all generalized potential functions and provide a suﬃcient condition
for the robustness to canonical elaborations. In Theorem 5, we consider a special class
of generalized potential functions such that Ai ∈ Ai for all i ∈ N and provide a suﬃcient
condition for the robustness to all elaborations.
Theorem 4 If g has a generalized potential function F : A → R with a GP-maximizer
X∗, then EX∗ is nonempty and robust to canonical elaborations in g.
Theorem 5 If g has a generalized potential function F : A → R with a GP-maximizer
X∗ such that Ai ∈ Ai for all i ∈ N, then EX∗ is nonempty and robust to all elaborations
in g.
If EX∗ is a singleton, then it is a minimal robust set and the equilibrium in EX∗ is
robust in the sense of Kajii and Morris [12, 13]. Clearly, if a GP-maximizer consists of
one action proﬁle, then EX∗ is a singleton. It is straightforward to see that EX∗ of the
example in the previous section is also a singleton where the GP-maximizer consists of
four action proﬁles.
It should be noted that EX∗ is not always a minimal robust set. For example, if a
generalized potential function is such that Ai = {Ai} for all i ∈ N, then EX∗ is the set of
all correlated equilibria.13 The above theorems are useful only when we have nontrivial
generalized potential functions.
In the remainder of this section, we prove Theorem 4 and Theorem 5 simultaneously.
The proof is presented in four steps.
13Kajii and Morris [12] noted the robustness of the set of all correlated equilibria.
14For the ﬁrst step, let (u,P) be an ε-elaboration of g and consider collections of
mappings
Ξi = {ξi : Ti → Ai | for all ti ∈ Ti\T
ui
i , ξi(ti) ∈ Ai contains
every undominated action of type ti},
Ξ = {ξ : T → A|ξ(t) =
Y
i∈N
ξi(ti) for all t ∈ T where ξi ∈ Ξi for all i ∈ N}
where we say that ai ∈ Ai is an undominated action of type ti if it is not a strictly
dominated action of type ti. We say that ai ∈ Ai is a strictly dominated action of type
ti if there exists a0
i ∈ Ai such that ui((a0
i,a−i),(ti,t−i)) > ui((ai,a−i),(ti,t−i)) for all
a−i ∈ A−i and t−i ∈ T−i with P(ti,t−i) > 0. Note that Ξ is nonempty if and only if, for
all i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti\T
ui
i , there exists Xi ∈ Ai such that Xi contains every undominated
action of type ti. As considered in Theorem 4, if (u,P) is canonical and player i of type
ti ∈ Ti\T
ui
i has a strictly dominant action a
ti
i ∈ Ai then Ξ is nonempty because Ai is a
covering of Ai and there exists Xi ∈ Ai such that a
ti
i ∈ Xi. As considered in Theorem
5, if Ai ∈ Ai for all i ∈ N then Ξ is nonempty because Ai contains every action. To
summarize, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4 If (u,P) is canonical then Ξ is nonempty. If Ai ∈ Ai for all i ∈ N then Ξ is
nonempty.





for all ξ ∈ Ξ and consider the set of its maximizers Ξ∗ = argmaxξ∈Ξ V (ξ).
Lemma 5 If Ξ is nonempty then Ξ∗ is nonempty. If ξ∗ ∈ Ξ∗ then
X
t∈T,ξ∗(t)=X∗
P(t) ≥ 1 − εκ
where κ is a positive constant.
Proof. Let {ξk ∈ Ξ}∞
k=1 be such that
lim
k→∞
V (ξk) = sup
ξ∈Ξ
V (ξ).
15Let Qk ∈ ∆(T ×A) be such that Qk(t,X) = P(t)δ(ξk(t),X) for all (t,X) ∈ T ×A where










P(t)F(ξk(t)) = V (ξk).
We regard {Qk}∞
k=1 as a sequence of probability measures on a discrete metric space
T × A. Note that, for every ε > 0, there exists a ﬁnite subset Sε ⊂ T such that
P
(t,X)∈Sε×A Qk(t,X) = P(Sε) > 1 − ε for all k ≥ 1. This implies that {Qk}∞
k=1 is
tight because Sε × A is ﬁnite and thus compact. Accordingly, by Prohorov’s theorem,14
{Qk}∞
k=1 has a weakly convergent subsequence {Qkl}∞
l=1 such that Qkl → Q∗ as l → ∞.
It is straightforward to see that there exists ξ∗ ∈ Ξ such that
Q∗(t,X) = lim
l→∞
Qkl(t,X) = P(t) lim
l→∞
δ(ξkl(t),X) = P(t)δ(ξ∗(t),X)
for all (t,X) ∈ T × A. Then
sup
ξ∈Ξ











Q∗(t,X)F(X) = V (ξ∗).
Therefore, ξ∗ ∈ Ξ∗ and thus Ξ∗ is nonempty.
Let F∗ = F(X∗), F0 = maxX∈A\{X∗} F(X), and F00 = minX∈A F(X). Note that
F∗ > F0 ≥ F00. Let ξ ∈ Ξ be such that ξi(ti) = X∗
i for all ti ∈ T
ui
i and i ∈ N. We have








≥ P(Tu)F∗ + (1 − P(Tu))F00 = (1 − ε)F∗ + εF00.




















Combining the above inequalities, we have














P(t) ≥ 1 − εκ
where κ = (F∗ − F00)/(F∗ − F0) > 0.











If ε > 0 is close to 0, then ui = gi with probability close to 1. In this case, the relationship
between V and (u,P) is similar to that between F and g. We already show that there
exists an equilibrium of g assigning probability 1 to the maximizer of F, i.e., X∗. In
the third step below, we will show that there exists an equilibrium of (u,P) assigning
probability 1 to some maximizer of V , i.e., ξ∗ ∈ Ξ∗.
Let Ξ be partially ordered by the relation ⊆ such that ξ ⊆ ξ0 for ξ,ξ0 ∈ Ξ if and only
if ξi(ti) ⊆ ξ0
i(ti) for all ti ∈ Ti and i ∈ N.
Lemma 6 If Ξ∗ ⊆ Ξ is nonempty, then it contains at least one maximal element. If ξ∗
is a maximal element of Ξ∗, then (u,P) has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ∗ ∈ Σ such
that σ∗(t) ∈ ∆(A) assigns probability 1 to the action subspace ξ∗(t) ∈ A for all t ∈ T,
i.e.,
P
a∈ξ∗(t) σ∗(a|t) = 1 for all t ∈ T.
Proof. If every linearly ordered subset of Ξ∗ has an upper bound in Ξ∗, then Ξ∗ contains
at least one maximal element by Zorn’s Lemma. Let Ξ0 ⊆ Ξ∗ be linearly ordered. Fix
t = (ti)i∈N ∈ T. For each i ∈ N, observe that
{Xi |Xi = ξ0
i(ti), ξ0 ∈ Ξ0} ⊆ Ai
17is linearly ordered by the set inclusion relation. Since this set is ﬁnite, it has a maximum













i(ti). Consider {ξ(i,t) |i ∈ N} ⊆ Ξ0. Since this set is linearly ordered








i(ti) for all i ∈ N. For ε > 0, consider {ξhti |t ∈ T, P(t) > ε} ⊆ Ξ0.
Since this set is linearly ordered and ﬁnite, it has a maximum element ξhsi. Simply






i(ti) for all ti ∈ Ti and i ∈ N such that





i(ti) for all ti ∈ Ti and i ∈ N. Note
that ˜ ξ is an upper bound of Ξ0. Since ξε(t) = ˜ ξ(t) for t ∈ T with P(t) > ε, it must be
true that
|V (˜ ξ) − V (ξε)| ≤ max
X,X0∈A




This implies that limε→0 |V (˜ ξ) − V (ξε)| = 0. Note that V (ξε) = maxξ∈Ξ V (ξ) because
ξε ∈ Ξ∗. Therefore, V (˜ ξ) = maxξ∈Ξ V (ξ) and thus ˜ ξ ∈ Ξ∗, which completes the proof of
the ﬁrst half of the lemma.
We prove the second half. Let ξ∗ ∈ Ξ∗ be a maximal element. Let ξ∗










i = {σi ∈ Σi |
P
ai∈ξ∗








j. We show that there exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ∗ ∈ Σ∗.
Let βi : Σ∗
−i → 2Σ∗
i be such that βi(σ−i) = argmaxσi∈Σi Ui(σi,σ−i) ∩ Σ∗
i for all
σ−i ∈ Σ∗
−i; and let β : Σ∗ → 2Σ∗
be such that β(σ) =
Q
i∈N βi(σ−i) for all σ ∈ Σ∗. Note
that β is the best response correspondence of (u,P) restricted to Σ∗.
We show that β has nonempty values. This is true if and only if, for all i ∈ N,
σ−i ∈ Σ∗
−i, and ti ∈ Ti,
ξ∗






P(t−i|ti)σ−i(a−i|t−i)ui((ai,a−i),t) 6= ∅. (3)
Suppose that ti ∈ Ti\T
ui
i . Then (3) is true because ξ∗
i (ti) contains every undominated
action of type ti.
18Suppose that ti ∈ T
ui
i . Rewrite the left-hand side of (3) as
ξ∗





































for all a−i ∈ A−i. Because ξ∗ is a maximal element of Ξ∗,
ξ∗































i (X−i)F(Xi × X−i)
where Λ
ti






















i (a−i)gi(ai,a−i) 6= ∅ (5)
































> > > > > > > <
















i (X−i) = 0 and a−i ∈ X−i,
0 if Λ
ti
i (X−i) = 0 and a−i 6∈ X−i.




−i(t−i) σ−i(a−i|t−i) = 1 for all t−i ∈ T−i, we have
λ
ti,X−i










and thus (5). Therefore, (3) is true by (4) and (5).
We have shown that β has nonempty values. We can show that Σ∗ is compact15 and
convex and that β has a closed graph and convex values. By Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg
ﬁxed point theorem, β has a ﬁxed point σ∗ ∈ Σ∗, which is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
of (u,P).
We now report the fourth and ﬁnal step. An immediate implication of the above
lemmas is the following. If (u,P) is canonical (the case considered in Theorem 4), or if
Ai ∈ Ai for all i ∈ N (the case considered in Theorem 5), then (u,P) has a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium σ∗ ∈ Σ such that
P




















P(t) ≥ 1 − εκ
(6)
where ξ∗ is a maximal element of Ξ∗. Thus, to complete the proof, it is enough to show
that, for every δ > 0, there exists ¯ ε > 0 such that, for all ε ≤ ¯ ε and every ε-elaboration
with a Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ∗ satisfying (6), there exists µ ∈ EX∗ such that
maxa∈A |µ(a) − σ∗
P(a)| ≤ δ.
Seeking a contradiction, suppose otherwise. Then, for some δ > 0, there exists a
sequence {(uk,Pk)}∞
k=1 such that:
• (uk,Pk) is an εk-elaboration of g and εk → 0 as k → ∞.
15A strategy subspace Σ
∗ is compact with the topology of weak convergence deﬁned in {ρσ ∈ ∆(T ×
A)|σ ∈ Σ
∗, ρσ(t,a) = P(t)σ(a|t) for all (t,a) ∈ T × A}.
20• (uk,Pk) has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ∗k with
P
a∈X∗ σ∗k




P (a)| > δ for all µ ∈ EX∗ or EX∗ = ∅.
By Lemma 1, {σ∗k
P }∞










P (a)| = 0









P (a) ≥ lim
l→∞
(1 − εklκ) = 1,
we have µ ∈ EX∗. This is a contradiction, which completes the proof of the theorems.
5 Unordered Domains
We restrict attention to the class of generalized potential functions such that domains
are partitions of action spaces. Let Pi ⊆ 2Ai\∅ be a partition of Ai. We write P =
{
Q
i∈N Xi |Xi ∈ Pi for i ∈ N} and P−i = {
Q
j6=i Xj |Xj ∈ Pj for j 6= i}, which are
partitions of A and A−i, respectively. The partition element of Pi containing ai ∈ Ai is
denoted by Pi(ai). Similarly, the partition element of P containing a and that of P−i
containing a−i are denoted by P(a) and P−i(a−i), respectively. We say that a function
v : A → R is P-measurable if v(a) = v(a0) for a,a0 ∈ A with a0 ∈ P(a).
Deﬁnition 7 A P-measurable function v : A → R is a best-response potential function
of g if, for each i ∈ N,







for all Xi ∈ Pi and λi ∈ ∆(A−i) such that







A partition element X∗ ∈ P is a best-response potential maximizer (BRP-maximizer) if
v(a∗) > v(a) for all a∗ ∈ X∗ and a 6∈ X∗.
21For example, consider the special case where Pi is the ﬁnest partition, i.e., Pi =
{{ai}}ai∈Ai for all i ∈ N. Then, it is straightforward to see that a function v : A → R is














for all i ∈ N and λi ∈ ∆(A−i).16 For example, a weighted potential function is a
best-response potential function by (2). However, a best-response potential function is
not always a weighted potential function, even if there are no dominated actions, as
demonstrated by Morris and Ui [20]. Thus the class of best-response potential functions
is much larger than the class of weighted potential functions.
A best-response potential function v induces a generalized potential function. Let
F : A → R be such that A = P and F(P(a)) = v(a) for all a ∈ A. Note that
P-measurability of v implies that F is well deﬁned. Since A−i is a partition of A−i,
λi ∈ ∆Λi(A−i) if and only if
P
a−i∈X−i λi(a−i) = Λi(X−i) for all X−i ∈ A−i by Lemma 3.











i). This implies that, if























for all λi ∈ ∆Λi(A−i) by the deﬁnition of best-response potential functions. Therefore,
F : A → R is a generalized potential function. This proves Lemma 2 and immediately
implies the following result by Theorem 4, which generalizes Theorem 3.
Proposition 1 If g has a best-response potential function v : A → R with a BRP-
maximizer X∗, then EX∗ is nonempty and robust to canonical elaborations in g.
16A best-response potential function considered by Voorneveld [35] is a function satisfying this condi-
tion for the class of beliefs such that λi(a−i) = 0 or 1. Thus, best-response potential functions in this
paper form a special class of those in Voorneveld [35].
226 Ordered Domains
Let Pi be a partition of Ai such that Pi is linearly ordered by the order relation ≤i for
i ∈ N. Let Zi and Zi be the smallest and the largest elements of Pi, respectively. The
corresponding product order relation over P is denoted by ≤N, and that over P−i is
denoted by ≤−i, respectively. If Pi(ai) ≤i Zi for ai ∈ Ai and Zi ∈ Pi, we simply write
ai ≤i Zi. For Xi ⊆ Ai, we say that ai ∈ Xi is minimal in Xi if ai ≤i Pi(xi) for all xi ∈ Xi
and that ai ∈ Xi is maximal in Xi if ai ≥i Pi(xi) for all xi ∈ Xi.
Deﬁnition 8 Let X∗ ∈ P be given. A P-measurable function v : A → R with v(a∗) >
v(a) for all a∗ ∈ X∗ and a 6∈ X∗ is a monotone potential function of g if, for all i ∈ N
and λi ∈ ∆(A−i), there exists
















such that Pi(ai) ≥i Pi(ai), and symmetrically, there exists
















such that Pi(ai) ≤i Pi(ai). A partition element X∗ ∈ P is called a monotone potential
maximizer (MP-maximizer).
We restrict attention to a complete information game g satisfying strategic comple-
mentarities or a monotone potential function v satisfying strategic complementarities in
the following sense.
Deﬁnition 9 A complete information game g satisﬁes strategic complementarities if,







i ∈ Ai and a−i,a0
−i ∈ A−i such that Pi(ai) >i Pi(a0
i) and P−i(a−i) >−i
P−i(a0
−i). A function v : A → R satisﬁes strategic complementarities if an identical
interest game g with gi = v for all i ∈ N satisﬁes strategic complementarities.
23Note that if the partition Pi is the ﬁnest one, then the order relation ≤i naturally
induces an order relation over the action set Ai and the above deﬁnition of strategic
complementarities reduces to the standard one.
A monotone potential function v with an MP-maximizer X∗ induces a generalized
potential function with a GP-maximizer X∗ if g or v satisﬁes strategic complementarities.









for i ∈ N where [Z0
i,Z00









Note that [Zi,Zi] = Ai ∈ Ai. For Z0
−i,Z00
−i ∈ P−i with Z0
−i ≤−i Z00
−i and Z0,Z00 ∈ P
































A = {[Z0,Z00]|Z0,Z00 ∈ P, Z0 ≤N X∗ ≤N Z00}.
Note that, for [Z0
i,Z00
i ] ∈ Ai and [Z0
−i,Z00
−i] ∈ A−i, [Z0,Z00] = [Z0
i,Z00
i ] × [Z0
−i,Z00
−i] ∈ A.
Let F : A → R be such that
F([Z0,Z00]) = V (Z0) + V (Z00)
where V : P → R is such that V (P(a)) = v(a) for all a ∈ A, which is well deﬁned by
P-measurability of v. Note that F(X∗) > F(X) for all X ∈ A\{X∗}. By showing that
F is a generalized potential function, we claim the following result.
Proposition 2 Suppose that g has a monotone potential function v : A → R with an
MP-maximizer X∗. If g or v satisﬁes strategic complementarities, then EX∗ is nonempty
and robust to all elaborations in g.
24Proof. By Theorem 5, it is enough to show that F : A → R given above is a generalized
potential function of g with a GP-maximizer X∗.
For Λi ∈ ∆(A−i), let Z∗
i ,Z∗∗
i ∈ Pi be such that
[Z∗
i ,Z∗∗

























λi(a−i)gi(xi,a−i) 6= ∅ (7)




























































































































−i,Z−i]) if Z−i ≥−i X∗
−i,
0 otherwise.





for all Z−i ∈ P−i. We show that Γ00
i ﬁrst order stochastically dominates Γi and Γi ﬁrst
order stochastically dominates Γ0
i. We say that Q−i ⊆ P−i is a decreasing subset of
P−i if Z−i ∈ Q−i and Z0
−i ≤−i Z−i together imply Z0
−i ∈ Q−i. The deﬁnition of the
stochastic dominance relation says that Γ00
i ﬁrst order stochastically dominates Γi if, for








It is known that Γ00
i ﬁrst order stochastically dominates Γi if and only if, for any increasing








We show (8) for two cases separately, X∗
−i 6∈ Q−i and X∗
−i ∈ Q−i. If X∗
−i 6∈ Q−i, then
Z−i ≥−i X∗







17We say that Gi : P−i → R is increasing if Gi(Z−i) ≥ Gi(Z
0




i (Z−i) = 0 unless Z−i ≥−i X∗
−i. If X∗































































i ﬁrst order stochastically dominates Γi. Symmetrically, we can show that
Γi ﬁrst order stochastically dominates Γ0
i.
Using the stochastic dominance relation, we show that
[Z∗
i ,X∗





λi(a−i)gi(xi,a−i) 6= ∅, (9)
[X∗
i ,Z∗∗





λi(a−i)gi(xi,a−i) 6= ∅, (10)
which imply (7). For Z−i ∈ P−i, let λ
Z−i





> > > > <
> > > > :
λi(a−i)
Γi(Z−i)
if Γi(Z−i) > 0 and a−i ∈ Z−i,
1
|Z−i|
if Γi(Z−i) = 0 and a−i ∈ Z−i,









i (a−i) for all








































i(Z−i)V (Pi(xi) × Z−i).











is minimal in the argmax set. Let






be minimal in the argmax set and let














be maximal in the argmax sets, respectively. Since v is a monotone potential function, it
must be true that Pi(ai) ≤i Pi(bi) and Pi(a0
i) ≤i Pi(b0
i). Suppose that g satisﬁes strategic
complementarities. For any xi ∈ Ai with Pi(xi) <i Pi(b0
i),
gi(b0




whenever P−i(a−i) >−i P−i(a0





















28whenever Z−i >−i Z0










increasing in Z−i. Since Γi ﬁrst order stochastically dominates Γ0













































This implies that Pi(b0
i) ≤i Pi(bi). Therefore, Z∗
i = Pi(a0
i) ≤i Pi(b0
i) ≤i Pi(bi) and
thus (9) is true. Suppose that v satisﬁes strategic complementarities. By the similar














































This implies that Pi(a0
i) ≤i Pi(ai). Therefore, Z∗
i = Pi(a0
i) ≤i Pi(ai) ≤i Pi(bi) and thus
(9) is true.
To summarize, if either g or v satisﬁes strategic complementarities, (9) is true. Sim-
ilarly, we can show that (10) is true. Therefore, we obtain (7).
We can obtain the simpler form of the MP-maximizer condition if a complete infor-
mation game satisﬁes diminishing marginal returns. We say that a complete information
game satisﬁes diminishing marginal returns if every player’s payoﬀ function is concave
with respect to his own action. Let Z+
i ∈ Pi be the smallest element larger than Zi 6= Zi,
and Z−
i ∈ Pi be the largest element smaller than Zi 6= Zi.
Deﬁnition 10 A complete information game g satisﬁes diminishing marginal returns
if, for each i ∈ N and a−i ∈ A−i,
gi(a+
i ,a−i) − gi(ai,a−i) ≤ gi(ai,a−i) − gi(a−
i ,a−i)
29for ai 6∈ Zi ∪ Zi, a+
i ∈ Pi(ai)+, and a−
i ∈ Pi(ai)−.
In the case of diminishing marginal returns, we will see that the MP-maximizer
condition reduces to the following simpler condition.
Deﬁnition 11 Let X∗ ∈ P be given. A P-measurable function v : A → R with v(a∗) >





















































i and ai ∈ Zi. A partition element X∗ ∈ P is called a local potential
maximizer (LP-maximizer).
We show that if a complete information game satisﬁes diminishing marginal returns,
then a local potential function is a monotone potential function, by which we claim the
following result.
Proposition 3 Suppose that g has a local potential function v : A → R with an LP-
maximizer X∗. If g satisﬁes diminishing marginal returns, and if g or v satisﬁes strategic
complementarities, then EX∗ is nonempty and robust to all elaborations in g.
Proof. By Proposition 2, it is enough to show that if g satisﬁes diminishing marginal
returns, then a local potential function v is a monotone potential function. Let






30be maximal in the argmax set and let






be minimal in the argmax set. We prove that Pi(ai) ≥i Pi(ai). If Pi(ai) = Zi, then
Pi(ai) ≥i Pi(ai). If Pi(ai) 6= Zi, then Pi(ai)
































for all xi ≤i Pi(ai)− and x−








for all xi ≤i Pi(ai)−. Therefore, it must be true that Pi(ai) ≥i Pi(a∗
i) = Pi(ai).
Symmetrically, let






be minimal in the argmax set and let






be maximal in the argmax set. By the symmetric argument, we can prove that Pi(ai) ≤i
Pi(ai).
Combining the above arguments, we conclude that a local potential function v is a
monotone potential function.






i} for all i ∈ N and an LP-maximizer is {a∗}.18 Note that a
complete information game satisﬁes diminishing marginal returns in the trivial sense. It
is straightforward to see that a function v : A → R is a local potential function with an
LP-maximizer {a∗} if and only if
• v(a∗) > v(a) for a 6= a∗,
• for all i ∈ N, v(ai,a−i) = v(a0
i,a−i) for ai,a0
i ∈ Ai\{a∗
i} and a−i ∈ A−i,
















for ai 6= a∗
i.
One can show that if g has a p-dominant equilibrium a∗ with
P
i∈N pi < 1 (see
Deﬁnition 4), then g has a local potential function v of this type. Thus, Theorem 2 is an
immediate consequence of Proposition 3, the above discussion and the following lemma.
Lemma 7 For p = (pi)i∈N ∈ [0,1]N with
P
i∈N pi < 1, g has a p-dominant equilibrium








i∈N pi if a = a∗,
−
P
i∈S pi if ai = a∗
i for i ∈ S and ai 6= a∗
i for i 6∈ S.
In addition, v satisﬁes strategic complementarities.
Proof. Since
v(a∗




1 − pi if a−i = a∗
−i,
−pi otherwise
18We have elsewhere labelled this class of local potential functions as “characteristic potential func-
tions” because there exists one-to-one correspondence between v : A → R and φ : 2
N → R by the rule
φ(S) = v(a) if and only if ai = a
∗
i for i ∈ S and ai 6= a
∗
i for i 6∈ S.
32for ai 6= a∗
i, v satisﬁes strategic complementarities. Note that v is P-measurable and




i,a−i) − v(ai,a−i)) = λi(a∗






−i) − pi ≥ 0
for ai 6= a∗
i. Thus, v is a local potential function function of g if and only if λi(a∗
−i) ≥ pi
implies (12), which is true if and only if a∗ is a p-dominant equilibrium. This completes
the proof.














i∈N pi if a ∈ X∗,
−
P
i∈S pi if ai ∈ X∗
i for i ∈ S and ai 6∈ X∗
i for i 6∈ S
with
P
i∈N pi < 1. If g has a local potential function v given above with an LP-maximizer
X∗, then X∗ can be regarded as a set-valued extension of p-dominance. In fact, Tercieux
[31] extended the notion of p-dominance to a set-valued one, p-best response set, and
demonstrated that a p-best response set X∗ is characterized by a local potential function
v given above with an LP-maximizer X∗.19
Local potential functions have the following characterization, which is easier to apply
in ﬁnding local potential functions. Remember that, in weighted potential functions, the
payoﬀ diﬀerence condition (1) leads to the belief condition (2).20 The condition in
the following lemma provides the payoﬀ diﬀerence condition which leads to the belief
condition in Deﬁnition 11.
Lemma 8 Let X∗ ∈ P be given. A P-measurable function v : A → R with v(a∗) > v(a)
for all a∗ ∈ X∗ and a 6∈ X∗ is a local potential function of g if, for each i ∈ N, there
exists µi(a−









i ,a−i) − v(ai,a−i)
¢
19We are grateful to Olivier Tercieux for discussions clarifying the relation between LP-maximizers
and p-best response sets, which led to small change in the formulation of the LP-maximizer condition.
20See Morris and Ui [20] for the duality argument between beliefs and payoﬀ diﬀerences.
33for all a−i ∈ A−i, and symmetrically, there exists µi(a+










i ,a−i) − v(ai,a−i)
¢
for all a−i ∈ A−i.

































i ,a−i) − gi(ai,a−i)
¢
≥ 0.
Thus, v satisﬁes the ﬁrst half of the condition in Deﬁnition 11. By the symmetric
argument, we can show that v also satisﬁes the second half. Therefore, v is a local
potential function.
If Pi is the ﬁnest partition for all i ∈ N, then the converse of the above lemma is
also true. For ai ∈ Ai, let a+
i ∈ Ai be the smallest element larger than ai and a−
i ∈ Ai
be the largest element smaller than ai.
Lemma 9 Suppose that Pi = {{ai}}ai∈Ai for all i ∈ N. Let a∗ ∈ A be given. A function
v : A → R with v(a∗) > v(a) for all a 6= a∗ is a local potential function of g if and only
if, for each i ∈ N, there exists µi(a−








i ,a−i) − v(ai,a−i)
¢
for all a−i ∈ A−i, and symmetrically, there exists µi(a+









i ,a−i) − v(ai,a−i)
¢
for all a−i ∈ A−i.
34Proof. It is enough to show the “only if” part. Suppose that v is a local potential
function. To show that µi(a−
i ,ai) and µi(a+
i ,ai) exist, we use Farkas’ Lemma.21 Farkas’
Lemma says that, for ﬁnite dimensional vectors a0,a1,...,am ∈ Rn, the following two
conditions are equivalent.
• If (a1.y),...,(am.y) ≤ 0 for y ∈ Rn, then (a0.y) ≤ 0.
• There exists x1,...,xm ≥ 0 such that x1a1 + ··· + xmam = a0.















i ,a−i) − gi(ai,a−i)
¢
≥ 0.







i ,a−i) − v(ai,a−i)
¢
≤ 0,








i ,a−i) − gi(ai,a−i)
¢
≤ 0.















i ,a−i) − gi(ai,a−i)
¢
for all a−i ∈ A−i where δa0
−i : A−i → R is such that δa0
−i(a−i) = 1 if a−i = a0
−i and
δa0
−i(a−i) = 0 otherwise. Thus,
gi(a−
i ,a−i) − gi(ai,a−i) ≥ x
¡
v(a−
i ,a−i) − v(ai,a−i)
¢
and we can choose µi(a−
i ,ai) = x. Symmetrically, we can show the existence of µi(a+
i ,ai),
which completes the proof.
21See textbooks of convex analysis such as Rockafellar [25].
357 Examples
As well as unifying the suﬃcient conditions for the robustness of equilibria provided
by Kajii and Morris [12] and Ui [34], our generalized potential approach generates other
suﬃcient conditions for the robustness of equilibria where the earlier results do not apply.
In this section, we discuss examples applying these new suﬃcient conditions.
3 × 3 Games
We ﬁrst discuss how to use Lemma 9. Consider the following g and v.
g
0 1 2
0 5, 5 3, 3 −4, 0
1 3, 3 7, 7 4, 6
2 0, −4 6, 4 6, 6
v
0 1 2
0 5 4 1
1 4 6 5
2 1 5 7
Assuming the ﬁnest partitions of players’ action sets, g satisﬁes diminishing marginal
returns and v satisﬁes strategic complementarities. In addition,
gi(1,aj) − gi(0,aj) = 2(v(1,aj) − v(0,aj)),
gi(2,aj) − gi(1,aj) = v(2,aj) − v(1,aj).
Thus, by Lemma 9, v is a local potential function with an LP-maximizer {(2,2)}, and
by Proposition 3, (2,2) is a robust equilibrium.
Frankel et al. [8] study LP-maximizers of two player three action games with symmet-
ric payoﬀs. They report a slightly involved but complete characterization of the unique
singleton LP-maximizer for this class.22 Oyama et al. [24] report a complete character-
ization of the unique singleton MP-maximizer in generic two player three action games
with symmetric payoﬀs satisfying strategic complementarities. These characterizations,
however, cannot be extended beyond three action games: Frankel et al. [8] establish the
non-existence of a singleton LP-maximizer in an open set of two player four action games
22Frankel et al. [8] describe an extension of the LP-maximizer condition that allows for continuous
action games and use it to provide suﬃcient conditions for an action proﬁle to be selected as the “noise
independent selection” of a global game. Equilibria that are robust to incomplete information will always
be the “noise independent selection” of a global game.
36with symmetric payoﬀs satisfying strategic complementarities and diminishing marginal
returns. An interesting (but open) question is whether the methods in this paper could
be used to characterize a minimal non-singleton local potential maximizer in two player
many action games with symmetric payoﬀs satisfying strategic complementarities and
diminishing marginal returns.
As noted above, recent results in Tercieux [31] showing the robustness of “p-best
response sets” can be shown to be a special case of our generalized potential results.
In the example we cited at the end of Section 2, the GP-maximizer {0,1} × {0,1} is a
“(1
3, 1
3)-best response set” in Tercieux’s sense. Tercieux [31] provides further examples
of action proﬁle sets satisfying the (p1,p2)-best response property, with p1 + p2 < 1, for
two player three action games.
Binary Action Games
For i ∈ N = {1,...,n}, let Ai = {1,2} and Pi = {{1},{2}} where Pi is linearly ordered
by the rule {1} ≤i {2}. Note that g satisﬁes diminishing marginal returns in the trivial
sense. By Lemma 9, v : A → R is a local potential function with an LP-maximizer
{1} = {(1,...,1)} if and only if v(1) > v(a) for all a 6= 1 and there exists µi ≥ 0 such
that gi(1,a−i) − gi(2,a−i) ≥ µi (v(1,a−i) − v(2,a−i)) for all a−i ∈ A−i and i ∈ N.





yi if a = 1,
zi if a = 2,
0 otherwise
where yi,zi > 0 for all i ∈ N. Note that g satisﬁes strategic complementarities. A
function v : A → R is a local potential function with an LP-maximizer {1} if and only
if v(1) > v(a) for all a 6= 1 and there exists µi ≥ 0 such that yi ≥ µi (v(1) − v(2,1−i)),
−zi ≥ µi (v(1,2−i) − v(2)), and 0 ≥ µi (v(1,a−i) − v(2,a−i)) for a−i 6= 1−i,2−i, for all
i ∈ N. Because zi > 0, we must have µi > 0 and v(1,2−i) − v(2) < 0. Then, we can
show that the above condition implies that yi/µi > zj/µj for all i 6= j. In other words,
{1} is an LP-maximizer only if there exists µi > 0 for i ∈ N such that yi/µi > zj/µj for
all i 6= j. We show this when i = 1 and j = n. Let {ak ∈ A}n
k=0 be such that, for each
37k, ak
i = 1 if i > k and ak
i = 2 if i ≤ k. Note that a0 = 1 and an = 2. We have
y1/µ1 ≥ v(a0) − v(a1),
0 ≥ v(ak−1) − v(ak) for k ∈ {2,...,n − 1},
−zn/µn ≥ v(an−1) − v(an).






= v(a0) − v(an) = v(1) − v(2) > 0.
It should be noted that there exist an open set of games that do not have any
local potential function. For example, all games in the neighborhood of the following
unanimity game do not have a local potential function with an LP-maximizer {1} or {2}.
Let N = {1,2,3}, y1 = 6, y2 = y3 = 1, z1 = z2 = z3 = 2. If {1} is an LP-maximizer,
then it must be true that 1/µ2 > 2/µ3 and 1/µ3 > 2/µ2, which implies that 1 > 4.
Thus, {1} is not an LP-maximizer. If {2} is an LP-maximizer, then it must be true
that 2/µ2 > 6/µ1 and 2/µ1 > 1/µ2, which implies that 4 > 6. Thus, {2} is not an
LP-maximizer.
Non-Singleton LP-Maximizers in Three Action Games
For i ∈ N = {1,...,n}, let Ai = {0,1,2} and Pi = {{0,1},{2}} where Pi is linearly
ordered by the rule {0,1} ≤i {2}. Note that g satisﬁes diminishing marginal returns in
the trivial sense. By Lemma 8, a P-measurable function v : A → R is a local potential
function with an LP-maximizer X∗ = {0,1}N if v(a∗) > v(a) for all a∗ ∈ X∗ and a 6∈ X∗,
and there exists µ0
i,µ1
i ≥ 0 such that
gi(0,a−i) − gi(2,a−i) ≥ µ0
i (v(0,a−i) − v(2,a−i)),
gi(1,a−i) − gi(2,a−i) ≥ µ1
i (v(1,a−i) − v(2,a−i))
for all a−i ∈ A−i and i ∈ N.





yi(a) if a ∈ X∗,
zi if a = 2,
0 otherwise
where yi : X∗ → R is such that yi(a) > 0 for all a ∈ X∗ and zi > 0. Note that g satisﬁes
strategic complementarities. A P-measurable function v : A → R is a local potential
38function with an LP-maximizer X∗ if v(a∗) > v(a) for all a∗ ∈ X∗ and a 6∈ X∗, and
there exists µ
ai
i ≥ 0 for ai ∈ {0,1} such that yi(a) ≥ µ
ai




i (v(ai,2−i) − v(2)), and 0 ≥ µ
ai
i (v(a) − v(2,a−i)) for a−i 6∈ X∗
−i ∪ {2−i}, for
all i ∈ N. Note that µ
ai
i > 0 and v(ai,2−i) − v(2) < 0 because zi > 0.
In general, a robust set induced by the LP-maximizer, EX∗, is not a singleton. Con-
sider Example 3.1 of Kajii and Morris [12]. Let N = {1,2,3} and zi = 1 for all i ∈ N.
Let the restricted game (yi)i∈N be the cyclic matching pennies game; each player’s pay-
oﬀs depend only on his own action and the action of his “adversary.” Player 3’s adversary
is player 2, player 2’s adversary is player 1, and player 1’s adversary is player 3. Thus,
for example, player 1’s payoﬀs are completely independent of player 2’s action. Every
player tries to choose action diﬀerent from his adversary’s. Player 1’s restricted payoﬀ
function is such that y1(1,0,a3) = y1(0,1,a3) = 3 and y1(1,1,a3) = y1(0,0,a3) = 2 for
all a3 ∈ {0,1}. The other players’ restricted payoﬀ functions are given similarly.
Kajii and Morris [12] showed that no single correlated equilibrium is robust. However,





2 if a ∈ X∗,
1 if a = 2,
0 otherwise
is a local potential function and X∗ is an LP-maximizer. Thus, EX∗ is a robust set.
8 Concluding Remarks
This paper introduces generalized potential functions and provides suﬃcient conditions
for the robustness of sets of equilibria. Special cases of the conditions unify the suﬃcient
conditions for the robustness of equilibria provided by Kajii and Morris [12] and Ui [34],
and provide new suﬃcient conditions.
The generalized potential technique introduced in this paper may be useful in analyz-
ing questions other than the robustness of incomplete information, as already suggested
by the work of Oyama et al. [24]. In addition, there are a number of open questions
about the robustness of equilibria. First, are robust equilibria unique if they exist? Kajii
and Morris [12] showed that a strictly p-dominant equilibrium with
P
i∈N pi < 1 is the
unique robust equilibrium; and we do not have examples of generic games with multiple
robust equilibria. However, we do not know an argument showing that robust equilibria
39of generic games must be unique if they exist. Second, how can we tell if a robust set is
a minimal robust set? Finally, is there a gap between robustness to all elaborations and
robustness to all canonical elaborations? The generalized potential technique might be
employed to answer each of these basic questions about the robustness of equilibria.
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